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ABSTRACT 
In the 21st century, new forms of community in dementia are emerging.  The existence of 
these communities challenges the individualisation of the self, which has come to 
characterise ‘person-centred’ approaches to dementia care over the last 30 years.  In this 
paper, an alternative approach (the inter-embodied self) is presented.  This approach to 
promoting selfhood in dementia is based on the premise that the self is not an intrinsic aspect 
of embodied Being but is instead a transactive phenomenon which exits in a perpetual state of 
becoming.  As such, the primary goal of practitioners should not be the fixing, reviving or re-
unifying of a pre-morbid self but, instead, enabling a rich and polyphonic montage of selves 
to emerge.  Drawing on a short documentary film about experiences of friendship in 
dementia, the paper concludes by highlighting the potential contribution of the inter-
embodied self to contemporary dementia care. 
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Part I: Introduction 
The shifting landscapes of dementia  
Dementia is an umbrella term incorporating a wide variety of neurological conditions, 
including Alzheimer’s disease, vascular dementia, dementia with Lewy Bodies, Pick’s 
Disease, alcohol related brain disease and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (Alzheimer's Society, 
2012). The term dementia is derived from the Latin demens (without mind) and emerged in 
medical parlance during the early 19th century in order to describe patients whose disability 
was related to acquired brain damage (Mckeith and Fairbairn, 2009).  
 
In the 21st century, the landscapes of dementia are shifting rapidly (Bartlett, 2012).  The 
population of people with dementia is expanding and, according to the World Health 
Organisation, there will be an additional 646 million people with dementia over the next 40 
years; taking the global population to 682 million by the year 2050 (World Health 
Organisation, 2012).  Developments in medical technologies, such as advances in genetic and 
pre-symptomatic screening (Sheinerman and Umansky, 2013, Stokholm, et al, 2013), 
increasing efficacy of pharmaceutical interventions (Bishara, 2012), and changes  to 
diagnostic criteria (Lopez, et al, 2011) are facilitating earlier diagnoses and increasing the 
number of people living with dementia as a chronic form of illness (World Health 
Organisation, 2012).  Parallel to these developments, people with dementia are increasingly 
coming together to share experience, forge new communities, establish shared-identities and 
campaign for social change (Bartlett, 2012, Bartlett and O'Connor, 2007, Williamson, 2012).  
This has been facilitated by the rapid expansion in internet technologies, creating new 
opportunities for sharing lived-experience of dementia (via blogging, tweeting and 
podcasting).  The establishment of trans-national dementia communities, such as Dementia 
Advocacy and Support Network International (DASNI) and dementiasupportnetworks.com 
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have inspired new visions of dementia in the 21st century; as Dr Richard Taylor, founder of 
dementiasupportnetworks.com highlights: 
 
‘My vision is a world with many folks living successful and purposeful lives with the 
symptoms of dementia. In this world, each of us is connecting, and connected to each 
other. We are kindred spirits. Indeed, each of our spirits is connected to each other 
through shared beliefs, similar life experiences, and feelings. Although persons living 
with the symptoms of dementia and their caregivers may differ slightly from each 
other, we are all wrestling with the same symptoms and the same disability. We are 
all trying to do what is best for each other and ourselves.’ 
(Taylor, 2013) 
These shifting landscapes of dementia inspire us to revisit established ways of thinking about 
the self and the self’s relationship to neurological disease.  In particular, these 21st century 
developments provoke us to question whether the promotion of individuality is a legitimate 
goal for dementia care policy and practice.  In this paper, I develop an alternative approach to 
promoting selfhood in dementia.  This approach, which I term the inter-embodied self, is 
based on the understanding that human selves are dividual; that is, transacted and reproduced 
across persons.  Thus, the process of becoming self is achieved through dialogical (self-other) 
interaction, both at the reflexive (discursive) and pre-reflexive (embodied) levels.  As I will 
argue, viewing the self in this way leads us to consider new principles for organising 
dementia care, which I label as: respecting dividuality, promoting dialogicality and 
embracing intercorporeality. 
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The regime of the (individualised) self in dementia 
According to Taylor (1989) and Rose (1996) the  self in Western societies is predominantly 
defined in terms of a profound inwardness, or internal psyche that is bounded within the body 
and that houses the unique stock of the individual’s biography.  This view of the self has 
evolved over centuries as a result of key geo-political developments; specifically, the 
Protestant Reformation, development of capitalist modes of economic production, the rise of 
liberal democracies and the growth of Psy forms of governmentality (e.g. psychiatry, 
psychology, psychotherapy).  These developments, Rose argues, has led to the regime of the 
self; implicit expectations that persons are (required to be) autonomous, independent, self-
governing individuals. 
 
Current UK policy initiatives such as the Personalisation Agenda in England (Department of 
Health, 2007), which sets out the principle of self-directed support, and the Dementia Care 
Standards in Scotland (Scottish Government, 2011) which enshrine the right to be treated as 
an individual, exemplify this deep respect (Hughes, Bamford and May, 2008) for the 
principle of individuality.  As Nolan et al  (2004) argue, this emphasis on the promotion of 
individuality is a direct consequence of the rise of ‘person-centred’ approaches to health and 
social care.  In dementia, person-centred care has been developed primarily through the work 
of social psychologist, and former school chaplain, Tom Kitwood and that of the Bradford 
Dementia Group, which Kitwood founded in 1992. 
 
Prior to this period in dementia care history, the onset and progression of dementia was 
widely associated with an equally progressive and irretrievable loss of self on the part of the 
sufferer (Cohen and Eisdorfer, 1986, Sweeting and Gilhooly, 1997).  Family members, 
friends, colleagues and acquaintances were thus exposed to a process of gradual dis-
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integration whereby the personality and unique characteristics of the person, that they have 
hitherto known and loved, were steadily eroded during ‘a funeral that never ends’: (Aronson 
and Lipkowitz, 1981: 569).  Kitwood was one of the first authors to radically de-stabilise this 
view, arguing that the notion of social death fundamentally de-humanises the person with 
dementia.  Citing social death as an example of malignant social psychology - ‘the 
unconscious defences, compulsions and interpersonal processes that pervade this field of 
work’ he seeks to recast the loss of the self in dementia as, less the progression of 
neurological disease, and more the result of ‘failure of understanding and care’ (Kitwood, 
1999: 3). 
 
Since its inception, the person-centred dementia care movement has produced new regulatory 
technologies (Foucault, 1988, Rose, 1996) such as Dementia Care Mapping (Bradford 
Dementia Group, 1997) and PIECE-dem (Brooker, et al, 2011), designed to monitor the 
impact of malignant social psychology and evaluate care quality according to person-centred 
criteria.  These criteria specifically include the extent to which the individuality of the person 
with dementia is recognised and promoted; as emphasised, for example,  in the person-
centred ‘VIPS’ framework (Brooker, 2007).   
 
Whilst the affirmation of individuality in dementia is, at least in part, a valiant response to 
perceptions that selfhood is under threat, one of the consequences of these new regulatory 
technologies is, I believe, the embedding of regimes of individuality within the whole gamut 
(Prior, 1993) of care relationships.    Individuality, as a state of Being, is not a pre-social 
phenomenon but is instead, part of the ‘collective frameworks within which people organise 
and report upon their social existence’ (Prior, 1993: 6).  Neither is individuality accepted 
across all cultures, as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1975: 48) highlighted: 
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‘The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated 
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, 
judgment and action, organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively against 
other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however 
incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's 
cultures.’ 
 
Individuality, then, does not merely reflect subjective experience of dementia but, instead, 
actively serves to shape it; in as much as persons are expected to think, feel and act as 
individuals in their dealings with care services.    This reification of individuality and the 
promotion of it in dementia as qua ‘good’ must be treated with a degree of caution. This is 
because individuality is not the only means through which selfhood can find full and creative 
expression in dementia.  Indeed, if we suspend our sense of awe for individuality and 
consider, instead, how families, friendship networks, practitioners and policy makers can 
contribute to the realisation of Taylor’s vision of dementia in the 21st century (see above), we 
begin to see alternative goals and avenues for the promotion of selfhood. In contrast to 
individualism, the project of the self that I outline is based on the assumption that the self is 
engaged in a constant process of becoming; a process in which people, like the Roman God 
Janus, look simultaneously to future and past states of Being.  Person-centred interventions 
such as Reminiscence Therapy (Woods, et al, 2005) and Validation Therapy (Bleathman and 
Morton, 1992) seek to either recognise, preserve or re-unify the self by enabling the 
(coherent) construction of the person’s biographical narrative. In contrast, our goal is not to 
attempt to revive or repair a hitherto ‘broken’ self but, instead, to facilitate a rich socio-
interactive environment through which a plurality of selves may thrive.  Enabling this 
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montage of selves thus requires a concerted effort to refrain from seeking to impose a 
unifying narrative on the self.  Instead, promoting montages of selves can be achieved by 
adhering to three core principles: respect for dividuality; promoting dialogicality; and 
embracing intercorporeality. 
 
Part II 
Respecting dividuality  
Dividuality (opposed to individuality) is an approach to personhood that is widely recognised 
within the anthropological literature yet has, to date, received surprising little attention in 
relation to dementia.  As Marriot (1976) and Strathern (1988) have argued, dividuality is 
based on the belief that persons are created through processes of sharing and transaction, as 
opposed to being bounded ‘motivational and cognitive universes’ (Geertz, 1975: 48).  Whilst 
dividual approaches to personhood were originally observed in studies of non-Western 
cultures, the extent to which dividuality is unique to such societies has been the subject of 
considerable debate (see Smith, 2012).  There is insufficient space to reproduce these 
arguments here, nor is it essential to the progression of this paper; suffice to say that, ‘In all 
cultures there exists … both dividual and individual modalities or aspects of personhood’ 
(Lipuma, 2000: 131). 
 
Whilst recognising that the promotion of individuality continues to serve important functions 
in dementia care, Lipuma’s observation prompts us to temper our deep respect for 
individuality with equal respect for the dividuality of persons.  Recognising dividuality in 
dementia involves developing an appreciation of the transactive qualities of persons; 
specifically their ability to  give out, from them-selves, ‘particles of their own coded 
substances that may then reproduce in others, something of the nature of the persons in 
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whom they have originated’ (Marriott, 1976: 111). We have all seen this process in action; 
for example, whenever a parent tells their child ‘I see a lot of my self in you’ or when a wife 
may refer to her husband (or vice versa) as ‘My other half’.  Within these everyday sayings, 
the literal overlaps with the metaphorical in ways that highlight the complex and multi-
faceted sharing of selfhood between bodies (insert footnote).  It is precisely through such 
capacity for transaction that the rich and diverse montages of our selves are able to emerge.  
Hence, recognising that we can transmit-and-receive the best of our selves is crucial to the 
creation of meaningful, egalitarian relationships in dementia. 
Promoting dialogicality  
Dialogicality has been defined as the ability of the human mind to conceive and communicate 
in relation to otherness (Marková, 2003).  Since the turn of the 21st century, a number of 
social psychologists have sought to explore the utility of this concept in their attempts to 
develop more inter-subjective (as opposed to intrinsic) models of selfhood.  One of the most 
influential, Dialogical Selfhood Theory (DLT), was developed by Herbert Hermans.  
According to Hermans, self and other are not mutually distinct but instead co-exist within a 
single body; as ‘a multiplicity of positions among which dialogical relationships can develop’ 
(Hermans, 2001: 243).  In this context, the self may be conceptualised not as a single, 
unifying perspective, but as a polyphonic novel; that is, a story told by a combination of 
competing authors.  Within our polyphonic selves, therefore, exists ‘a plurality of 
consciousnesses and worlds’ that develop in dialogical relationship with each other (Hermans 
2001: 245).  Promoting dialogicality in dementia therefore involves attempting to enable this 
rich (polyphonic) variety of consciousness and worlds to develop, by facilitating the 
conditions through which dividual selves may enfold-and–transmit aspects of their 
polyphonic consciousness.  This can be done discursively, through the sharing of lived 
experience, or pre-reflexively, at the level of embodied interaction (see below).  Either way, 
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enabling people to come together (both literally and metaphorically) is central to creating the 
conditions through which dialogicality in dementia can develop. 
Embracing intercorporeality 
Traditionally, the body has been a neglected focus in relation to selfhood in dementia 
(Kontos, 2005, Martin, et al, 2013, Twigg, 2010).  Although this omission was originally 
recognised by Kitwood (1999) the subsequent evolution of person-centred care has paid 
surprisingly little attention to the body as a vehicle for selfhood, which has led to an over-
emphasis on discursive interventions (Kontos, 2005).  According to Kontos, the person is his 
or her body, in as much as the self is maintained through the gestures, movements and bodily 
habits generated by the ‘primordial capacity of the body to pre-reflectively perform’ (Kontos, 
2005: 560). These aspects of the self, which Kontos describes as embodied selfhood, endure 
throughout the dementia journey, ‘despite the ravages inflicted by neuropathy’ (Kontos, 
2005: 566). 
 
Whilst Kontos’ work is useful in highlighting the role of the pre-reflexive aspects of the self, 
it is important to recognise that embodiment and the ‘socio-interactive environment’ (Kontos, 
2005: 557) are not separate entities.  Bodies do not exist in a pre-social state but are, instead, 
constituted and experienced through socio-interactive behaviour (Weiss, 1999).  Embracing 
this intercorporeal aspect of the self therefore, is to recognise the ways in which selfhood is 
transacted, pre-reflexively, through embodied interaction. 
 
In this context, intercorporeality refers to the belief that subjective experience does not 
originate purely from within the body, but is instead formed through our interactions with 
other embodied Beings.  This theory was initially developed by phenomenologist Merleau-
Ponty.  In his posthumously published work, Merleau-Ponty (1968) describes the body as a 
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Chiasm; an entity that is simultaneously a material object - with an objective physical 
presence - and a hub of subjective experience: 
 
‘[O]ur body is a being of two leaves, from one side a thing among things and 
otherwise what sees them and touches them; we say, because it is evident, that it 
unites these two properties within itself, and its double belongingness to the order of 
‘object’ and to the order of the ‘subject’ reveals to us quite unexpected relations 
between the two orders.’  
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 137) 
  
Whilst, according to Merleau-Ponty, the chiastic nature of the body provides the basis for 
intercorporeality, it is through the Flesh Of The World that intercorporeal experience is made 
possible.  This is not flesh in a conventional sense but, rather, an element of Being previously 
un-categorised within philosophy (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 139).  According to Merleau-Ponty, 
Flesh creates a nexus between the objective and subjective realms, through ‘the coiling over 
of the visible upon the seeing body, [and] of the tangible upon the touching body’ (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968: 146).  His conceptualisation of feeling bodies as Chiasms, and of the role Flesh 
plays in weaving relations between them, positions bodies as mutually constituting – the 
product of a complex milieu of physiological (e.g. touch), emotional (e.g. empathy) and 
psychological (e.g. discursive) interaction.  Following this approach, the aspects of the 
embodied self which Kontos describes (the gestures, movements and mannerisms) are not 
solely the resource of ‘individuals’ but, instead, may be transmitted, and enfolded, through 
embodied interaction.  Embracing intercoporeality in dementia therefore involves promoting 
and celebrating the sharing of embodied selfhood.  
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Part III 
Case study: friendship in dementia  
In order to illustrate the importance of respecting dividuality, promoting dialogicality and 
embracing intercorporeality, this section draws on the experiences of two friends, Agnes and 
Nancy, who are members of the Scottish Dementia Working Group.  Empirical data are 
extracted from the documentary film Agnes & Nancy (http://vimeo.com/32903503; accessed 
02/13/2013), directed by Anne Milne and commissioned by Dr Ruth Bartlett and Caroline 
Hick as part of the ESRC-funded No Limits – Re-Imaging Life With Dementia Exhibition.  
The film provides a series of vignettes that highlight Agnes’ attempts to re-define her self in 
light of her diagnosis of dementia, through her relationship with Nancy.  As such, it provides 
valuable insights into the processes of becoming-self with dementia.  According to Agnes, 
this process involves a “blending and merging” of past and current selves into a hybrid, 
“third person”. 
 
Agnes: “I think what I was doing is clearing my head into saying, “This is how I was.  
This is me with dementia”.   And I want to have another head and say “This is me 
now” the blending and the merging of these two images into the one; into as I am 
now.” 
 
During the documentary, Agnes travels to the Black Isle to visit Nancy, who has been living 
with dementia for eight years.  During their conversations, Agnes tells Nancy of her desire to 
dialogically transact; in other words, to achieve the self that she perceives in Nancy and 
which she attributes, in part, to membership of the Scottish Dementia Working Group. 
 
Nancy:  “Do you remember the first time we met? 
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Agnes: Do you know I can hardly remember that.  I remember going in; see, at the 
beginning, when I went into the group, I was cowered and I was quiet and I could 
hardly string words together, and I was quite intimidated, and I was in awe of the 
laughter and the energy in the room.  I was attracted to your personality because of 
the laughter and the calm and I was drawn like a magnet. 
Nancy: Wow 
Agnes:  You know, and that’s the way it was.  Time-wise, we’ve talked about that; 
time means nothing … 
Nancy:  That’s right 
Agnes:  … and I don’t have an essence of time.  That, the dementia has distorted that.  
So, you’ve obtained what I’m hoping to obtain and, with laughter and humour and 
insight you know, so I think that’s what it is; it’s just your total humanness.” 
 
We are presented with several examples of how Agnes seeks to develop her-self through her 
transactions with Nancy.  Crucially, we see examples of how this dividual self-work is 
achieved through intercorporeal, pre-reflexive relating. Agnes, for example, is shown by 
Nancy how to use her body to saw, axe and prepare wood for the fire; a routine feature of 
Nancy’s daily life and therefore part of her embodied selfhood - the gestures, movements and 
bodily habits performed by Nancy at the pre-reflexive level (Kontos, 2005) - that, until this 
point, are alien to Agnes.  Agnes and Nancy are also filmed mirroring each other’s bodies in 
more synchronised ways; as they practice Tai Chi and Yoga together in the sunshine of 
Nancy’s garden.  Through these intercorporeal exchanges, the embodied aspects of Nancy’s 
self become infolded, by Agnes, through a process of ‘osmosis’. 
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Agnes:  ‘You couldn’t get any further away from the Black Isles than where I am, and 
I brought home here, a bit of essence of the Black Isle and hope.  Immediately I’ve 
transformed me into that third person that we spoke about.  I’m re-inventing the new 
Agnes I think with the help of some of the strategies that Nancy taught me by 
osmosis…  And it will go on, yes, we will go on in our journey.  But wow, what a 
journey and what are we creating out of it; some really magical, special moments…’  
 
Discussion 
I have argued that the changing nature of community in dementia is increasingly prompting 
us to consider new ways of conceptualising selfhood and of encouraging the self to thrive 
despite of the presence of neurological disorder.  Person-centred approaches to dementia, 
whilst producing many tangible benefits, have contributed to the reification and lionisation of 
individuality; a culturally specific and normative framework for ordering subjectivity.  In 
contrast to the individual self, I have sought to develop an alternative framework; namely, 
that of the inter-embodied self.  Based on a dividual understanding of personhood, the inter-
embodied self is intended to highlight the transactive capacity of the self.  This quality allows 
for aspects of the self to be infolded and transmitted between embodied Beings, as part of 
their perpetual process of becoming-self.  Contrary to person-centred approaches, the inter-
embodied self does not require a unified or coherent narrative in order to thrive. On the 
contrary, our inter-embodied selves may be more fruitfully conceptualised as montages; 
polyphonic repertoires of voices and experiences that co-exist in dialogical relationship to 
one-another; constantly updating, constantly changing.  This dialogical process of becoming-
self is, following Agnes, characterised by a ‘blending and merging’ of self-identities, through 
which new selves (‘third persons’) emerge and are added to the montage.  This, as we have 
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seen, is not contingent upon our capacity for reflexive engagement, as much occurs, via 
‘osmosis’, at the pre-reflexive, intercorporeal level.  
 
How then, might this conceptualisation of the inter-embodied self help facilitate advances in 
dementia care?  Writing from an Ethic of Care approach,   Tronto and Fisher defines care as: 
 
‘[A] species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue and 
repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible.  That world includes 
our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of which we seek to weave in a 
complex, life-sustaining web.’ 
(Tronto, 1993: 103) 
 
One of the main contributions of the inter-embodied self, as I see it, is the dissolution at the 
conceptual level of unhelpful and artificial distinctions between carer and cared-for in 
dementia; for a corollary of this distinction is that people with dementia are defined solely in 
terms of their need to receive - as opposed to their ability to provide - care.  Such qualitative 
distinctions serve to construct the care relationship as a one-way street as opposed to a ‘life-
sustaining web’.  Yet, the existence of online communities such as DASNI, and campaigning 
organisations such as the Scottish and European Dementia Working Groups, are testaments to 
the agential role that people with a diagnosis of dementia bring to the care assemblage.  In 
addition to obscuring the abilities of people with a diagnosis of dementia, defining persons 
without a dementia diagnosis as ‘carers’ risks relegating them to a secondary division within 
the care assemblage; in that we become interested in their subjectivity only in so far as it 
impacts upon the (cared-for) person.  As Taylor (2012) states, ‘Although persons living with 
the symptoms of dementia and their caregivers may differ slightly from each other, we are all 
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wrestling with the same symptoms and the same disability.’  In contrast to person-centred 
approaches, where care is provided by carers and received by people with dementia, inter-
embodied selves that are located within the dementia care assemblage are simultaneously 
conceptualised as carers and cared-for; as they infold these properties within them-selves and 
give out, from thems-elves, ‘particles of their own coded substances that may then reproduce 
in others, something of the nature of the persons in whom they have originated’ (Marriott, 
1976: 111). Thus, promotion of inter-embodied selfhood is based on an appreciation of the 
similarities, rather than the individual differences, of people (both with and without a 
diagnosis of dementia) which, I believe, is crucial to the promotion of solidarity in care 
(Barnes, 2012), which Taylor aspires to. 
 
Thus, by offering an alternative model to that contained within the regime of the self (Rose, 
1996) the inter-embodied self leads us to consider new techniques and interventions for the 
promotion of selfhood in dementia, based upon more holistic definitions of what care is.  
Whilst alternatives to person-centred care have previously been developed, these frameworks 
tend to retain implicit assumptions regarding the individuality of persons (see Hughes, 
Bamford and May, 2008).   As core principles, respect for dividuality, promoting 
dialogicality and embracing intercorporeality have much to offer the development of practice 
frameworks, which seek to build solidarity (as opposed to individualism) in care. This paper 
provides some initial groundwork upon which practice-based models can be developed.  
Whilst the work presented here is largely theoretical, there is, after all, ‘nothing more 
practical than a good theory’ (Lewin, 1952: 169). 
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Summary and conclusions 
In the 21st century, the landscapes of dementia are shifting (Bartlett, 2012).  These 
developments are inspiring new theoretical approaches to selfhood and challenging 
established views that people with dementia are passive recipients, as opposed to active 
facilitators, in care and in the perpetual process of becoming-self.  As we move further into 
the 21st century, in which new approaches to the constitution and dynamics of care in 
dementia are evolving, the artificial distinctions between self and other, carer and cared-for, 
are beginning to dissolve. 
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